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Abstract—Recent advances in blockchain technologies have
provided exciting opportunities for decentralized applications.
Specifically, blockchain-based smart contracts enable credible
transactions without authorized third parties. The attractive
properties of smart contracts facilitate distributed data vending,
allowing for proprietary data to be securely exchanged on a
blockchain. Distributed data vending can transform domains
such as healthcare by encouraging data distribution from owners
and enabling large-scale data aggregation. However, one key
challenge in distributed data vending is the trade-off dilemma
between the effectiveness of data retrieval, and the leakage risk
from indexing the data. In this paper, we propose a framework
for distributed data vending through a combination of data
embedding and similarity learning. We illustrate our framework
through a practical scenario of distributing and aggregating
electronic medical records on a blockchain. Extensive empirical
results demonstrate the effectiveness of our framework.
Index Terms—blockchain, big data, machine learning, health-
care, electronic medical records
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent years have witnessed surging interests in blockchain
technology [27], an open and decentralized ledger that links
transaction records using blocks and provides proven security
backed by cryptography. Blockchain was first introduced as
the infrastructure supporting the electronic cash system Bit-
coin [20], and is now transforming a wide domain of industries
such as supply chains [28], biomedical research [14], health-
care [6], [13], [23], financial transactions [9], networking [37]
and social networks [9]. Of particular interest is the Ethereum
blockchain [31], which has enabled credible transactions with-
out trusted third parties by introducing smart contracts, with
small programs running on top of the blockchain to provide
transparent and secured contracting with reduced transaction
costs.
The advent of blockchain infrastructures paved the way
for a new domain of data vending, allowing individual data
owners to directly benefit from sharing proprietary data over
the blockchain. In the era of big data, vast amount of data
collected has been widely used to improve decision making
for industries, namely through building personalized recom-
mender systems [12], [15] and targeted advertisement [5]. As
a result, organizations that collect and aggregate data at scale
stand to profit enormously in the process. However, as data
stakeholders, the users from whom the data is collected from
rarely get their share of dividends despite significant contri-
butions to the fortune. In fact, in most cases, organizations
regard collected data as their private assets and prevent the data
Fig. 1: Illustration of the proposed distributed data vending
(DDV) framework. DDV enables private data to be exchanged
through smart contracts.
from being shared even for research purposes, which could
otherwise contribute to the advancement of our society.
Perhaps a prime example lies in our healthcare system,
where electronic health records (EHR) systems are now de-
ployed in most hospitals across the United States. In recent
years, medical histories in EHR have been used to build
data-driven models to improve healthcare resource manage-
ment [35], [36]. Analyses of the EHR data often reveal impor-
tant insights into the underlying pathophysiology of numerous
complicated diseases [34]. These discoveries are invaluable
to the development of drugs and treatments. However, the
patients who own the data [7] and contribute to research
outcomes are rarely rewarded for their contributions, despite
the hiking healthcare costs which accompany the rise of
healthcare information exchange in recent years [8], [16]. On
the other hand, many research institutions such as universities
have an extremely difficult time to access existing health
data because of strict regulations such as HIPPA [21] and
bureaucracy, even though there are individuals willing to share
their medical histories, especially when they are incentivized
to do so.
In this paper, we propose a distributed data vending (DDV)
framework which consists of a suite of machine learning
modules to enable individuals to exchange data on blockchains
through smart contracts. Like other vending services, a data
entry has to be indexed and retrieved before it can be ex-
changed on blockchains. However, the challenge comes from
the dilemma between data indexing and information leakage:
building indexes for retrieval requires access to the data, which
is hard to achieve on blockchains where no trusted third
parties are available. To tackle this challenge, the proposed
DDV approach generates a signature of the data entry using a
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privacy-preserving data embedding procedure. The signature
can be published along with the data access in smart contracts.
The framework also provides task-specific similarity functions,
which take the signatures as input to measure the similarity
among data entries. The proposed DDV framework can be
used in many data vending scenarios, and in this paper we
use EHR data vending as a concrete example to illustrate the
concept and its feasibility. We also provide extensive empirical
evaluations to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed
framework.
II. RELATED WORK
Even though the distributed data vending is a rather new
problem, the challenges of this problem are closely related to
many existing studies, such as health data management based
on blockchain, data embedding techniques and distance metric
learning in machine learning. We will briefly survey these
areas and point out the relationship to this study.
A. Blockchain Applications on Healthcare Data
The properties of blockchain make it a promising tool
in many health informatics applications [13]: from building
decentralized backbones for health data exchange and in-
teroperability, protocols enforced by immutable ledgers that
keep track of clinical research [26], data provenance and
robustness of medicine production through pharmaceutical
supply chain [2], [25], to maintain patient privacy and EHR
security through the persistence of consent statements in
blockchain [3]. The proposed DDV framework utilizes an
existing blockchain infrastructure to facilitate data exchange,
and provides an effective tool to collect medical data and thus
accelerate medical research.
B. Medical Information Exchange on Blockchain
Of particular interests is the domain of medical information
exchange, where many studies have been done to facilitate
the second use of EHR data for clinical/biomedical research.
Examples include MedRec [1], [6], Healthbank [18] and Mod-
elChain [14]. MedRec [1], [6] is closely related to the proposed
research. It proposed a blockchain-based data management
system to consolidate the fragmented medical records. The
system involves patients in the data life cycle, allowing the
patients to take control of the permission of their own medical
records, and encouraging medical stakeholders to participating
the blockchain network with incentives of aggregated data. The
work delivered an important message that patients are one of
the data owners, can serve an important role in data sharing
among stakeholders, and should be controlling the data sharing
process. However, one major issue in this framework is that the
data is persistent in a data center of the hospital system, which
requires the API exposure for remote access. Such practice is
usually hard to implement due to the excessive security risks
of external APIs. Moreover, since query strings of the database
are persistent in smart contract, it would incur significant
maintenance costs during data migration [29]. In the proposed
DDV framework, we make no assumptions on the physical
location of data. Once the smart contracts including desired
information are retrieved, the contracts can grant access to data
stored anywhere in the cloud.
C. Data Embedding and Distance Metric Learning
In machine learning research, data embedding has been
studied for decades. The embedding can be learned in a
supervised fashion (e.g., linear discriminant analysis [19])
which learns a low-rank subspace that captures most of
the discriminative information, or an unsupervised one (e.g.,
principal component analysis [10]), which learns a subspace
to capture the geometric manifold of the data matrix. More
recently, the advances of deep learning lead to highly non-
linear embedding techniques such as autoencoders [30] as well
as recurrent neural networks for embedding time sequence
data [24]. In many information retrieval systems we need to
provide a distance metric to evaluate the similarity between
pairs of data points, and distance metrics vary from task
to task. The distance metric learning [32] is one type of
supervised learning that learns a metric from data for one
specific retrieval task. In medical informatics, for example,
the study of patient similarity attracts much research efforts,
which facilitates effective patient stratification and discovers
important risk factors [4].
In this paper, we propose to use a two-stage approach to
combine the data embedding and distance metric learning,
which firstly learns a privacy-preserving signature to effec-
tively summarize the original private data, which is then used
to compute similarity by a chosen similarity metric learned
from database, to achieve retrieval of smart contracts, without
compromising the integrity of the private data.
III. PRIVACY-PRESERVING DATA VENDING
Data vending is the exchange of private data between
individual data providers (owners) and data consumers. The
purpose of distributed data vending (DDV) is to enable data
providers to use existing blockchains as infrastructure to list
the data. Data consumers then retrieve data from blockchain
and complete the purchase. The entire data exchange process
is done without trusted third parties involved. In this section,
we introduce the DDV framework and its key components. We
use vending of medical records as a running example in the
remaining of this paper and we note that the same technique
can be extended to the setting of general data vending1.
A. Distributed Data Vending
Assume a data provider (i) would like to sell some private
data to others for profits and the data entity can be represented
in the form of a multi-dimensional tensor Xi ∈ Rd1×···×dk
(which subsumes the matrix case Xi and the vector case
xi), where d1 . . . dk are the dimensionality of k modes. For
example, the purchasing history of a person can be represented
in a tensor capturing [item × time × location], or the watching
1By general data vending we mean the data is structured and can be
represented in a vector/matrix/tensor form
history for a set of users using [item × user × time] ten-
sor [11]. And the historical medical records of a patient can
be represented in the form of a sparse matrix [36] capturing
[time × diagnosis].
In order for potential data consumers to find the availability
of Xi, the data provider needs to list the information of the
data to a listing service, such that the consumers can query
the listing by sending a relevance criteria. The payment and
data exchange can be done once the data entity is identified
as relevant and fits the budget of the consumer.
Even though we are using many of such listings everyday,
for example Amazon for general merchandise and Netflix for
movies, a listing for general data vending is very different.
Merchandise can be listed according to categories and proper-
ties, where as a movie or a song can be retrieved from its artist,
genre and the year of release. However, there is no predefined
categorical information for an arbitrary data tensor Xi, and
thus it is challenging to retrieve the data tensor needed. When
vending medical data, one potential data consumer may be
interested in knowing answers to query questions such as “did
this patient have any diagnosis of hypertension before?” or
“how many past encounters of renal failures in the past three
years?”, before deciding whether or not to purchase the data.
In order to provide response to such query, the listing service
has to know all the details of the data, i.e., the listing service
has access to the entire data to be exchanged.
When the listing service is a trusted 3rd party, such query
is feasible. However, such listing service is associated to an
extremely high security risk: once the 3rd party listing server
is compromised, all the data entries on the listing server will
be leaked. Different from other listing services, once the data
themselves are leaked there is no way to control the perimeter
of damage. As such, there is a strong demand of a distributed
data vending framework, facilitating a decentralized vending
procedure that does not involve the listing service from a
trusted 3rd party. Smart contracts has provided a secured and
efficient tool for vending contracts on top of blockchains.
However, without the 3rd party listing, the retrieval problem
now involves a dilemma: On one hand, we want to enable
effective retrieval for data consumers to identify the data
entities of interest; on the other hand, indexing data entities
requires detailed information of the data, which can leak the
content of data entities before they are purchased for use.
To illustrate this leakage in the context of medical records,
assume that we expose the number of diagnoses of Congestive
Heart Failure (CHF) and Chronic Kidney Disease (CKD) in
the smart contract to enable indexing. Any data consumer
now can simply iterate through all available smart contracts
in the blockchain, and the consumer can explicitly compute
the marginal distributions Pr(CKD) and Pr(CHF), the joint
distribution Pr(CKD,CHF), as well as conditional distribution
of Pr(CKD|CHF) and Pr(CKD|CHF). The data leakage does
not stop at statistics level, as such distributions allow one to
directly build predictive models, say, using Naı¨ve Bayes, to
infer posterior probabilities of any diseases used for indexing.
However, to acknowledge the data contribution to such predic-
Fig. 2: Illustration of the learning of privacy-preserving sig-
natures in DDV.
tive model, any data provided involved should be paid through
executing the associated smart contracts.
In order to balance retrieval efficiency and data leakage
without a 3rd party listing, we propose a distributed data
vending (DDV) framework. In this framework we first embed
the data into a private preserving signature vector, and then
maintain a set of public similarity metrics. The signature of
a data entity are publicly available in smart contracts selling
the entity, and the retrieval is done by combining the data
signatures and similarity metrics.
B. Data Signature
We propose to use data embedding techniques to compute
data signature. The goal of data embedding is to project a
data entry to a usually lower-dimensional subspace such that
the data entry can be represented by a low-dimensional vector.
Formally, we denote an embedding function f that projects a
data tensor Xi ∈ Rd1×···×dk to a vector zi ∈ Rp, and thus
fθ(Xi)→ zi, where the vector θ includes a set of parameters
of the projection function. One way to obtain the vector
representation to extract a set of summary statistics from the
tensor, and however, it is hard to warrant the effectiveness
of retrieval because of the difficulty from estimating how
much information are covered by summary statistics. On
the other hand, different data entities may have different
shapes/dimensionality, and it is challenging to design such
statistics manually.
When there are many data entities available, the data
embedding can be done in a data-driven way, i.e., we learn
a projection function such that the subspace learned can be
maximally recover the data entities. Let D = {X1,X2 . . . ,Xn}
be a set of n data entities available for training, the data-driven
embedding is given by the following objective:
min
θ,γ
∑n
i=1
`
(Xi, f−1γ (fθ(Xi))) , (1)
where `(·, ·) is a loss function that evaluate the recovery
error, and f−1γ is an inversion function of f that tries to
reconstruct the data entity from the embedded vector, and γ
is the parameter of the inversion function. f is usually called
encoder and f−1 is corresponding decoder.
Let θ∗, γ∗ be an optimal solution pair to (1), then we can
publish θ∗ and the functional form of f , for example to a
blockchain. Then any data provider who wants to sell data Xj
can now compute the embedding vj = fθ∗(Xj) and publish vj
along with the smart contract. We call this embedding vector
the signature of the data matrix Xj . Details of this publishing
will be illustrated in Sec. III-D. Next we discuss two important
issues associated to the embedding process.
a) Incremental Signature Learning: A high performance
projection fθ guarantees that the signature includes a compre-
hensive description of the data entry been projected. Therefore
learning a good projection function is the key for effective
retrieval. Since the projection function depends on the data
entries D used for training, and usually we do not have
a large amount of data to start. As more data entities are
available, the projection function can be updated to improve
its performance. This suggests an online learning approach to
incremental update parameters of the embedding function θ.
For example, using:
[θ+, γ+] = [θ−, γ−]− τ∇[θ,γ]`
(
Xi, f−1γ− (fθ−(Xi))
)
,
where τ is the step size for incremental update, which is
converging to 0, and the superscripts + and − denote before
and after the update respectively.
b) Privacy-Preserving Signature: The rationale behind
releasing the signature vj to public is the belief that vj cannot
be used to recover the original data entry Xj . Conceptually
this is highly likely because that the original data Xj is in a
much larger space than the signature vj , and such projections
are supposed to single directional, and given vj the chance of
recovering the original space is small. However, because that
the embedding projection is learned in a way that seeks an
structured manifold of the original data in D, it is possible
to recover the original data once the shape of the manifold is
obtained. And manifold information is captured in the inverse
function f−1γ , which is why the reconstruction f
−1
γ∗ (fθ∗(Xi))
can be quite small in practice. Therefore protecting f−1γ∗ is
essential to protect the signatures. Once an accurate approxi-
mation of f−1γ∗ is obtained by adversarial parties, they can use
it to recover a large amount of information by going through
the signatures alone.
On the other hand, since f is publicly available, it is
reasonable to assume that the functional form of f−1 is also
publicly available. This implies that once the parameters in γ
are estimated, then the signatures are compromised. In fact,
when someone already purchased quite a few data entries, the
purchased data entries can be used to construct a dataset D˜,
which can then be used to estimate the decoder:
γ˜ = argminγ
∑
X∈D˜ `
(Xi, f−1γ (fθ∗(Xi))) , (2)
where γ˜ is the estimated decoder from D˜. Therefore we
propose to apply a Gaussian noise to the computed signature
to destroy the manifold structure, i.e., given a data entry X ,
we compute the privacy-preserving signature v by:
v = fθ∗(X ) + ,  ∼ N
(
0, σ2
)
, (3)
where σ2 is the variance controlling the magnitude of the
noise, and should be chosen to balance the retrieval ef-
fectiveness and privacy level: a higher magnitude of noise
gives stronger privacy protection but weakens the retrieval
performance, and vice versa. We illustrate such trade-off in
the empirical study section. The procedure of obtaining the
signature is summarized in Figure 2.
C. Similarity Retrieval
Once a privacy-preserving signature v is computed using
(3), a data provider can then create a smart contract and pub-
lish the signature in the smart contract. Since the blockchain
is publicly available, and data consumers can now get the
list of signatures for all available data entries. In order to
retrieve a set of relevant data entries to purchase, a consumer
can complete the retrieval by comparing the signature of
the purchase with a query signature vˆ. Directly comparing
two signature vectors through cosine similarity cos(v, vˆ) or
inner product vT vˆ may not be effective, as the subspace of
v is chosen to maximize the reconstruction and thus may
not be specific for the desired retrieval task. For example,
one consumer wants to retrieval medical records that have
prior diabetes diagnoses, and another consumer is interested
in building models from those identified as dementia. For
these two retrieval tasks, given the same query signature vˆ,
the ranked list of data entities should look very different,
because that the the definitions of “similarity” are different.
From the machine learning perspective, the subspace learning
for signature belongs to the unsupervised learning paradigm,
and we need a supervised learning procedure and learn a
similarity function st(v, vˆ) that is specific to task t, to carry
out an efficient retrieval. Equivalently, we can learn a distance
function dt(v, vˆ) for the same purpose (by reversing the
retrieved rank).
Let the dt be the Mahalanobis distance, i.e., dt(v, vˆ) =√
(v − vˆ)TMt(v − vˆ), where Mt is the parameter matrix that
instructs how the distance should be computed for a specific
task. Given the dataset Dt for retrieval task t, the parameter
matrix Mt can be estimated using a distance metric learning
loss, e.g., the large-margin [22]. We denote the loss function as
`ε. When there are many retrieval tasks, their parameters can
be estimated jointly using the multi-task learning paradigm, to
transfer knowledge among tasks [22], [33]:
min
M1,...,Mt
∑T
t=1
(∑
(i,j)∈Pt
dt(vi, vj)
2+∑
(i,j,k)∈It
`ε (dt(vi, vj), dt(vj , vk))
)
,
s.t. Mt  0,∀t, [M1, . . . ,MT ] ∈M,
where dt is parameterized by Mt, Pt is the partial order set in
dataset Dt, and It is the triplet order set in Dt and each triple
(i, j, k) indicates the distance between dt(vi, vj) is closer than
dt(vi, vk), and the positive semi- definiteness of Mt makes the
objective a convex programming. The subspace M constrains
the solution spaces of Mt and connects them to enable
knowledge transfer. The subspace structure can be defined
using many of existing multi-task learning approaches [33],
such as shared subspace basis, sparsity patterns, or composite
structures.
Fig. 3: Illustration of workflow for the proposed distributed
data vending.
The multi-task metric learning approach can effectively
improve the performance of distance metrics when there are
limited amount of data supervision available, which improves
the generalization of metrics through knowledge transfer. The
simpler single task learning approach can be used once a
large amount of training data is available, which reduces the
additional bias introduced by multi-task learning priors. When
distance metrics are learned for retrieval tasks, the metrics can
be published online to a publicly available metric library, with
the descriptions of tasks that they are associated to.
D. Distributed Data Vending Workflow
In this section we summarize the workflow of the proposed
DDV framework. We assume the public availability of the
following building blocks: the encoder fθ∗ and a metric library
that includes a set of well-trained distance metrics. These
metrics can be updated over time to improve the effectiveness
of the retrieval.
a) Data Provider: A data provider is an entity who
owns private data and can potentially sell the data pieces on
blockchain.
b) Provider Device: A provider device is owned and
trusted by a data provider. A typical provider device can be
a smartphone. When a data provider wants to sell a piece
of data, the raw data is firstly formatted into a data entity,
representing the data into a tensor (or matrix/vector). The
encoder fθ∗ is then used to embed the data into a privacy-
preserving signature vector. After that the provider device
generates an AES key and uploads the data encrypted by this
key to a data server. The data provider then creates a smart
contract in the blockchain as described above.
A purchase from any consumer triggers a decryption process
where the data provider sends the AES key to the data
consumer via a secure channel after handshaking. The provider
device then regenerates an AES key, encrypts the data using
the new AES key again and sends the new copy of encrypted
data to the data server for the next purchase.
c) Data Server: A data server hosts the encrypted data
entities from data providers. Whenever a download request is
initiated by a data consumer on a certain data entity, the server
first retrieves its associated smart contract in blockchain. When
the data consumer is authenticated by its public key in the
smart contract, the encrypted data can be be downloaded by the
data consumer. The data server then requests a new encrypted
data for the next download request. This data ensures that
each time a download is verified, a new AES key will be used
for the next download. This way each encrypted copy of data
entity will be valid for only once, so that the data will not
be at risk if the data server gets compromised. See remarks
below for how the AES key is deployed and retrieved.
d) Blockchain: The blockchain infrastructure can be any
chain that enables smart contracts, such as Ethereum [31] or
VeChain [28]. Whenever a data provider lists a data entity for
sale, a smart contract is created that includes the data signature,
an access URL of the data server (e.g., an AWS server) or an
API address for retrieval, a list of public keys that granted
data access, as well as the selling price for the data access.
The smart contract can also include many more details such
as demographic information of the patient if the data is EHR.
e) Data Consumer: A data consumer starts with a data
collection task in mind, uses an existing data for query or
construct the query, and applies the embedding function to
compute the query signature. Based on the retrieval task,
the provider then obtains the task-specific distance metric
to rank the similarity of data entries available for purchase.
Once identified one (or more) smart contract that includes
data for purchase, the consumer then provides the public key
and the demanded payment to the blockchain to execute the
contract. Once the transaction is confirmed in the blockchain,
the consumer then authenticates itself using its private key to
download encrypted data from the data server. Meanwhile, the
data consumer retrieves the AES key from provider device via
the established secure channel between them. The download
begins once the payment is verified by the server and the data
is decrypted using the AES key.
The workflow is summarized in Figure 3. In the next section
we show a concrete example how the proposed DDV can be
used for EHR data vending.
Remarks on Authentication and Data Security: The AES key
is generated by and stored on the provider device, while the
encrypted data entity is stored on the data server. The isolation
of the key and the encrypted data prevents unauthorized
decryption in case a data server is compromised. Secure
channels between provider devices and data consumers are
established by handshaking using public/private keys of both
parties. The distribution of AES keys are done via the secure
channels. The one-time AES key and encrypted data entity
have further enhanced the data security of the framework.
IV. CASE STUDY: VENDING HEALTHCARE RECORDS
The limited access to medical data has been a major
bottleneck to many medical studies. With more data avail-
able, clinicians and data scientists can develop more accurate
disease models and drug effects to reduce health costs and
save lives. We believe that the proposed DDV framework can
be used to relieve the the scarcity of data in medical research
by encouraging patients to share self-reported medical history
through blockchain, and the data contribution is acknowledged
Fig. 4: Generating patient signature for vending medical records using the proposed DDV framework.
and rewarded by monetary incentives. In this section, we il-
lustrate a prototype implementation of our DDV framework in
the context of vending healthcare records. The implementation
includes two components: (1) incrementally learns signature
representations of longitudinal patient information and (2)
produces task-specific similarity metric for data retrieval.
Although previous studies have cited the effectiveness of
end-to-end sequence- to-sequence autoencoders over a wide
array of representation tasks [17], substantial data is often
required to obtain high-level performance using this approach.
In the EHR setting, medical records often vary in sample size
depending on the granularity of data available. For example,
we have around 20 times more visit-level data than patient-
level temporal data in our experimental database. This means
that a high-performing visit-level signature can be trained
before sufficient data is available to drive high-performing
patient-level signatures, which require many samples to cap-
ture both temporal patterns at the patient-level as well as
sparsity patterns at the visit-level. Thus, we decompose the
signature learning tasks into two sub-tasks, visit- and patient-
level signatures, so that our representation framework is better
suited for incremental online learning.
a) Visit-Level Signatures: Obtaining the visit-level signa-
ture is a dimensional reduction task which takes visit vectors
xi ∈ X and outputs embedded vectors gρ(xi), where gρ(.)
is the visit level signature function parameterized by ρ. In
this case, we do not consider differences between patients
and simply try to learn a low-dimensional representation of
medical visits. For each visit, we consider all the relevant
diagnostic ICD-9 group codes. Assume there are d ICD-9
diagnosis group codes for consideration, and training inputs
take on xi ∈ Rd one-hot vector format, with 1’s denoting
group codes present for the visit. We then project the training
vector into a q-dimensional dense latent space gρ(xi) ∈ Rq ,
and q  d.
We formulate the representation process as a multi-label
classification problem, with d binary classifiers trained in
parallel for each visit sample. We learn the pair of encoder
gρ with the help of a decoder g−1κ parameterized by κ. For a
vector x, let xˆρ,κi = g
−1
κ (gρ(xi)) be the reconstructed vector.
The parameters ρ, κ are then estimated from minimizing the
following reconstruction error:
min
ρ,κ
d∑
j=1
λj
∑
xi∈X
{
xi,j log
(
xˆρ,κi,j
)
+ (1− xi,j) log
(
1− xˆρ,κi,j
)}
,
where λj is the weight that is given to the particular task
j ∈ [1, d] which correspond to the group code to be predicted
during recovery. Depending on the sample, λj assumes 1.0
if the sample is negative for the group code and 3.0 if the
sample is positive for the group code during that visit. We
used multi-layer perceptron to implement both gρ and g−1κ .
b) Patient-Level Signatures: Once visit-level signature
embedding is learned, the original EHR tensor X can be
transformed into G, which contains embedded visits for each
patient across time. This way, when a vectorized representation
of sequential patient information, we by-pass the sparse recov-
ery problem mentioned in the previous section. Therefore, in
(1) we simply minimize over the mean-squared error (MSE)
between the original input G and the recovered tensor f−1(G)
from the embedding process:
`
(
Gi, f
−1
γ (fθ(Gi))
)
=
∥∥Gi − f−1γ (fθ(Gi))∥∥2F ,
where fθ and f−1γ are two recurrent neural networks (RNN).
Specifically, we applied long-short term memory (LSTM) units
to construct RNNs for the encoder and decoder. We note
that the number of visits differ for patients, so the number
of visit vectors recovered per patient depends on the input
patient. Thus, the RNN vector representation of G is robust to
variations in visit frequency of patients. The entire procedure
for generating patient signature is summarized in Figure 4.
V. EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we demonstrate the proposed distributed
data vending (DDV) framework using medical records as
elaborated in Section IV. We first introduce the dataset used
for training the signatures and similarity functions, then assess
the embedding performance and retrieval performance of DDV
on the real dataset, and finally discuss how the different noise
levels protect the signature and effect retrieval performance.
a) Dataset: We use a real EHR dataset from a hospital
that includes more than 283,000 patients with documented di-
agnostic histories. A typical patient diagnostic history consists
of a list of relevant ICD-9 diagnostic group codes for each visit
as well as a summary ICD-9 problem list for the patient. We
emphasize here that the difference between ICD-9 group codes
and ICD-9 codes lies in the fact that group codes consist of 3-
letter representations of original ICD-9 codes. For example,
a ‘250.00’ is the ICD-9 code for type-II diabetes (T2DM)
w/o specified complications, while ’250’ is the general ICD-
9 group code for type-II diabetic-related diseases, including
T2DM with and without various specified complications. The
group codes are typically used in feature representation of
patients, while the ICD-9 codes themselves provide greater
granularity in terms of querying during cohort-selection.
b) Embedding Performance of Patient-Level Signatures:
In the representation task, we try to capture medical history
information in the EHR database by finding a matrix repre-
sentation fθ(gρ(X )) = X′ of the visit histories of each patient
over the entire dataset tensor, X . Here, the vector representa-
tion x′i ∈ X′ should ideally capture the sparsity features as
well as the local temporal informations from the diagnostic
history matrix xi ∈ X for each patient. We therefore evaluate
the recovery performance of our representation across each
visit and at each timestep for all patients.
In total, there are 1041 group codes in our dataset, so
training inputs take on xi ∈ R1041 one-hot vector format,
with 1’s denoting group codes present for the visit. On average,
each patient visit averages 3.69 group codes out of the possible
1041. Thus, we give greater weight to sparse, positive labels
across all visits during training. Otherwise, an embedding
which recovers all 0 entries over 1041 group codes for each
visit can still achieve 0.99 accuracy due to the prominence of
negative codes.
We evaluate the effectiveness of the patient-level autoen-
coder in two ways (1) given the de-noised signature vector for
each patient, evaluate the micro-averaged precision and recall
across all visits over 5-fold validation and (2) after addition of
Gaussian noise  protection to each signature vector, re-train
the decoder to recover the original X and evaluate performance
over 5-fold validation. When a consumer purchases a substan-
tial amount of medical records, the individual can theoretically
train a decoder to recover the original medical dataset from
the publicly available signature vectors. By adding Gaussian
noise to the signatures, we can significantly limit the ability
of an accurate decoder to be trained and generalized to the
rest of the dataset. The noise-addition step thus serves as a
privacy-preserving procedure over publicly available signature
vectors. By comparing performance of the recovery processes
in (1) and (2), we can gauge the upper limit in the level
of granularity that a decoder is capable of recovering, given
various levels of noise during the privacy-preserving process.
Thus, (2) is included in our evaluation procedure as a measure
of ”decoder protection” which can be tracked in real time
during deployment.
From Figure 5, we see that the embedding quality, as
measured by recovery precision and recall over X from
f−1(fθ(gρ((X)))), improves greatly with increasing interme-
diate signature vector representation size up to saturation point
of around 2000 dimensions. At 6000 dimensions, signature
vectors were able to capture over 90% of the sparse temporal
Fig. 5: Recovery efficiency of autoencoder framework using
various signature vector dimension sizes.
features from the original data. This is unsurprising, as each
visit vector from the original dataset was 1041 in dimension,
and the average patient had 6.65 visits in their diagnostic his-
tories. It is notable that at 2000 feature dimensions, recovery
over 90% precision and recall was still achievable.
Figure 5 further illustrates the saturation of recovery effi-
ciency with increase in signature vector sizes. Here we see
that the shoulder of the performance curve occurs at 1000
dimensions, where increases in recovery efficiency decreases
dramatically with additional embedding dimensions. For the
purposes of scalable feature representation and retrieval per-
formance, we want to use an embedding size which provides
adequate compression of feature space from the original data
without drastically sacrificing embedding accuracy. We thus
recommend using 1000 dimensional embedding representa-
tion, as it provides over 7x compression of the original medical
data while preserving majority of the sparsity and temporal
properties for downstream tasks.
c) Decoder Protection: When considering embedding
performance a key question to consider is: can we maintain
the main information in the signature vector after adding
protection noise? To answer this question we use the original
decoder (jointly trained with the encoder) to recover data
matrices from noise protected signature vectors. In Figure 6,
we demonstrate the robustness of decoder recovery to privacy-
preserving Gaussian noise. Again, we witness an inflection
point in the ability of the decoder to learn an accurate
recovery of the original data under various noise levels.
Here, we center the Gaussian noise at mean of µ = 0.0
and increase the standard deviation of noise, σ =  where
 ∈ {0.10, 0.20, 0.40, 0.60, 0.80, 1.00, 1.20, 1.40, 1.80, 2.00}.
At each noise level , we construct a noise vector ν ∈ Rd,
where d is dimension of signature vector, and each component
of ν consists of a random scalar drawn from N (µ, ). For each
vector, we construct a different noise vector, drawn from the
same distribution under N (µ, ). This noise vector then gets
added to the original signature vector Xi.
As seen in Table I, the steepest drop in recovery perfor-
TABLE I: Recovery performance using 1000 dimensional
signature under various noise levels.
 Precision Recall
0.10 0.841 (±8.8× 10−4) 0.953 (±3.1× 10−5)
0.20 0.811 (±2.7× 10−5) 0.935 (±5.0× 10−6)
0.40 0.511 (±2.9× 10−4) 0.882 (±2.0× 10−5)
0.60 0.293 (±2.8× 10−4) 0.791 (±5.1× 10−5)
0.80 0.202 (±5.3× 10−5) 0.672 (±1.8× 10−5)
1.00 0.160 (±6.6× 10−6) 0.553 (±2.8× 10−5)
1.20 0.124 (±2.3× 10−5) 0.464 (±7.5× 10−5)
1.40 0.108 (±6.8× 10−6) 0.400 (±7.7× 10−5)
1.80 0.084 (±9.3× 10−7) 0.300 (±2.2× 10−6)
2.00 0.080 (±1.3× 10−6) 0.268 (±2.5× 10−6)
mance occurred between 0.40 ≤  ≤ 0.60, where precision
decreased from above 80% to below 50%. Further increases
in noise levels facilitate the exponential decrease in decoder
recovery, yet it is interesting to note that the exponential decay
of decoder performance did not occur until noise level reached
a substantial level. This is most likely due to the inherent
robustness of the decoder to noise at the input level. Another
interesting pattern to note is that added noise induced more
false-positive predictions by the decoder, which is indicated
by the increasing between precision and recall scores with
increasing noise levels.
Given the retrieval performance under noise protection, one
key question still remains: can we prevent users from recov-
ering the decoder when they have accumulated a reasonable
amount of protected signatures? We answer this question by
measuring decoder parameter changes during the re-training
procedure by first vectorizing the weight layers in the decoders
and then taking the Euclidean distance between the de-noised
parameters θ0 and re-trained parameters θ at each noise
level. Table II, examines these parametric differences between
the original decoder and the recovered one. One clear trend
is that as the magnitude of noise increases, differences in
parameter decrease during re-training. With increasing noise,
the decoder is less capable of learning correct parameters
due to the increasing randomness in the added noise. It is
important to note that while increase in noise level can provide
privacy over the signature vector signatures, the optimal level
of noise must be fine tuned against retrieval efficiency. In the
following section, we demonstrate the trade-off between the
protectiveness of high  noise-levels and the usability of the
transformed signature vectors for retrieval.
d) Retrieval Performance: From the standpoint of the
consumer, a typical query order on a medical database in-
clude selecting for patients with specific ICD-9 codes for
downstream cohort studies. For this reason, we formulate the
retrieval task as searching for top N patients, given a specific
cohort. We constructed 10 mutually exclusive cohorts, distin-
guished by ICD-9 codes. Table III summarizes the number of
available patients for each cohort. In total, there were 58,489
patients in this subset of the EHR database. Each patient has a
unique label in one-hot vector format, y ∈ R10. The retrieval
task is formulated as follows: given a cohort of interest, y,
Fig. 6: Decoder recovery performance at various noise levels
on 1000 dimensional vector signatures.
TABLE II: Changes in learned decoder parameters with in-
creasing noise.
 ||θ − θ0||22 ||θ − θ0||22/||θ0||22
0.10 91.96 0.402
0.20 90.56 0.395
0.40 85.94 0.376
0.60 85.75 0.375
0.80 87.51 0.382
1.00 90.16 0.393
1.20 83.70 0.366
1.40 81.64 0.357
1.80 81.53 0.355
2.00 81.64 0.360
find the top N patients that belonging to this cohort.
As mentioned in the previous sections, a similarity matrix
Mt is trained using multi-task metric learning [22] for each
task yt ∈ {y1, ...,y10}. Then, a characteristic query vector qt
is obtained for each task by taking the component-wise average
of signature vectors across the cohort. For example, the
congestive heart failure (CHF) cohort contains 1, 456 unique
patients, each represented by a signature vector x′i ∈ Rd.
The cohort can thus be represented by a 1, 456 × d matrix,
X′CHF. To perform the retrieval task, we take the characteristic
query vector to be q = 1m
∑m
i x
′
i, where m = 1, 456.
Once this query vector is obtained, Mt can be used to
calculate the distance for each patient in the cohort, where
dt(qt,x
′
i) =
√
(qt − x′i)Mt(qt − x′i). We then rank the
top N “closest” patients to the target query by Mahalanobis
distance and use them for retrieval evaluation.
We evaluate the performance of each retrieval task by calcu-
lating the precision@N score for N ∈ {10, 50, 100, 250, 500}.
By comparing precision at various retrieval sizes (N ), we can
deduce the scalability of various queries, given the metrics
Mt ∈ M learned by [22]. Table V demonstrates these
differences in scalability, as we can see that for tasks such as
MCI, CAD and CHF, retrieval precision decreases dramatically
TABLE III: Summary of cohorts for retrieval tasks.
ICD-9 Code Description Raw Count Exclusive
250.00 Type-II DM 39,699 13,381
427.31 Arrythmias 21,072 4,734
311 Depression 29,978 9,863
272.4 Hyperlipidemia 48,302 12,500
414.00 CAD 22,936 3,249
244.9 Hypothyroidism 22,416 6,167
162.9 Lung Cancer 5,397 2,927
428.0 CHF 13,516 1,456
174.9 Breast Cancer 8,379 3,672
331.83 MCI 2,473 540
Total 58,489
TABLE IV: Multi-task LMNN classification error rates.
Task Validation Testing
T2DM 2.750 2.621
Arrythmia 4.912 6.604
Depression 2.292 3.564
Hyperlipidemia 6.549 6.918
CAD 3.274 4.298
Hypothyroidism 3.602 3.826
Lung Cancer 0.655 0.786
CHF 3.274 3.878
Breast Cancer 1.834 1.992
MCI 1.965 2.306
after 100 cohorts, while for tasks such as T2DM, lung cancer
and breast cancer retrieval, precision remains near 100% even
at much larger retrieval sizes. By contrast, the actual largest
margin nearest neighbors (MT-LMNN) performance, as shown
in Table IV, indicates that the classification error remain
consistently below 7% across all tasks when classification is
done in a pair-wise manner between candidate patients. The
cross-cohort discrepancy between query-based retrieval and
MT-LMNN performance highlights the importance of query
design for accurate retrieval under our framework.
For example, in the case of T2DM, predictable patterns of
comorbidity often ensue the progression of the disease. End-
stage renal diseases (ESRD), ophthalmic and neurosensory
complications inevitably co-occur with T2DM during the
longitudinal development of symptomatology. On the other
hand, CHF does not follow a singular, predictable pattern
of development. In fact, CHF itself can be decomposed into
several subtypes of progression, all of which result from
vastly different compensatory pathways. Since the retrieval
task relies on a single query representation qt per cohort,
techniques such as signature-vector averaging and singular
vector selection may not adequately capture the variability
within certain cohorts. Future studies may focus on designing
effective ways to produce query vector representations which
can cover such variability within disease phenotypes.
e) Effect of Noise on Retrieval: As mentioned previously,
privacy-preserving noise produces a trade-off in performance
between recovery and retrieval: addition of high noise may
decrease decoder recovery, thereby increasing privacy, yet it
may also decrease retrieval performance. We examine the
TABLE V: Retrieval performance of learned cohort-specific
metrics using 1000 dimensional de-noised signatures. Top
performing queries include Type-II Diabetes Mellitus (T2DM),
lung and breast cancers, all of which achieved ≥ 99% preci-
sion at various retrieval sizes.
Cohort Prc@10 Prc@50 Prc@100 Prc@250 Prc@500
T2DM 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Arrythmia 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.684 0.408
Breast Cancer 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.996 0.988
CAD 1.000 0.935 0.581 0.352 0.194
CHF 1.000 0.940 0.466 0.200 0.106
Depression 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.686
Hyperlipidemia 1.000 1.000 0.794 0.784 0.608
Hypothyroid 1.000 0.981 0.979 0.624 0.408
Lung Cancer 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
MCI 1.000 0.781 0.443 0.184 0.100
effect of noise on retrieval performance by re-learning sim-
ilarity matrices Mt ∈M for each individual task while using
the increasingly noisy versions of signature vectors. Retrieval
performance was again evaluated using precision@N at each
noise level  ∈ {0.0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1.0} across various
retrieval tasks. This time, we included only the top performing
retrieval tasks, including: T2DM, lung cancer, breast cancer,
depression and arrhythmia. These tasks possess the highest
performing queries from the de-noised retrieval setting.
As shown in Figures 7b - 7f, precision scores drop dramat-
ically with increasing noise levels. With  > 0.6, the recov-
ery behavior becomes more erratic and may not follow the
monotonically decreasing trend as seen with the typical case.
Figures 7b and 7c demonstrate the noise-levels that are capable
of producing accurate retrievals for majority of the tasks.
When comparing with the privacy-preserving performance
shown in Figure 6, we see that the optimal noise level for 1000
dimension signatures is  = 0.4, as this level of noise disrupts
decoder learning enough to limit the consumer’s capacity to
recover the original dataset while maintaining precision during
retrieval. We notice that in both recovery and retrieval, noise
levels beyond  = 0.6 leads to erratic behavior. In the case of
recovery, decoder performance decreases exponentially with
increasing noise above 0.6, but retrieval performance suffers
greatly in response.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied the problem of distributed data
vending, which allows personal data to be securely exchanged
on a blockchain. We proposed a framework for distributed
data vending through a combination of data embedding and
similarity learning, to tackle the dilemma between the effec-
tiveness of data retrieval, and the leakage from indexing the
data. Distributed data vending can transform domains such
as healthcare by encouraging data distribution from owners
and its aggregation. We illustrated our framework through a
practical scenario of distributing electronic medical records
on a blockchain. We conducted extensive empirical results to
demonstrate the effectiveness of our framework.
(a)  = 0.0 (b)  = 0.2
(c)  = 0.4 (d)  = 0.6
(e)  = 0.8 (f)  = 1.0
Fig. 7: Heatmap displays of retrieval efficiency across various
retrieval demands with increasing noise levels.
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